I catch a fair number of podcasts in the course of a week, although almost no crazy-making, infuriating, traditional news (unless embedded in a podcast). Whether long-form or short-, podcasts fuel and sate my curiosity just fine without my giving too much attention to straightforward propaganda and thought control, which seems to be the aim of corporate media. There is no tag at the bottom of the page for quick hits or hot takes on topics for which I don’t want to write full posts, and periodic tab dumps lack appeal and timeliness. Instead, a handful of relatively succinct ideas will appear under this title so that I can describe what crosses my path and provide modest commentary. No links provided.
The first item comes from a lightly moderated debate between Robert Sapolsky and Daniel Dennett on the question of free will (i.e., do we have it?). Sapolsky takes the materialist/determinist view that free will is an illusion, whereas Dennett believes free will exists at various levels of strength throughout life. This question tires me quickly because it doesn’t lead anywhere; whether free will be an integral part of cognition or illusory doesn’t affect or change how individuals go through life. It’s a purely academic question that doesn’t really demand an answer, though considerable time is wasted contemplating the question and confusing people. The crux of Sapolsky’s argument is basic scientific reductionism. If an action or decision (e.g., will the next fork of food be peas or potatoes? to use a banal example) is predicated on a cause, Sapolsky insists on inquiry into the cause of the cause of the cause, etc. until a root cause is found. That’s an obvious infinite regress and blind alley, a rhetorical trick deployed simply by posing the question. By analogy, Sapolsky would seek the origin of a flowing river in upstream confluences, then headwaters, then elevated runoff of rain or melt water, then rain, snow pack, or glacier before arriving at the hydrological cycle. It’s exhausting and pointless.
In contrast, Dennett has no requirement that what’s clearly a process or flow be subordinated to a materialist search for root cause(s). (Dennett similarly obviates the need for an inner viewer of consciousness in the so-called Cartesian theater a/k/a the ghost in the machine that puzzles other philosophers.) Why try to capture the wind? Dennett instead describes free will as a skill or competency one gains through maturation. Age-related readiness thresholds are customary before individuals can be trusted with certain types of decision making. So don’t hand a loaded gun to a 5-year-old, who does not yet understand the concept of death and will most likely treat the weapon like a toy. Several thresholds are bunched at the end of adolescence as minors reach their majority. At the end of life, if the mind deteriorates, free will typically ebbs with it. The notion of free will is also central to society being bound by a set of laws, which requires punishment and removal not of free will but civil freedom and personal choice. That’s what incarceration accomplishes after severe infractions. Dennett’s view is far more sensible and has the distinct advantage of already being instantiated in culture.